This is the fourth in a five-part series exploring the details of the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act. See also part 1, part 2, and part 3.
I grew up in New York and was a die-hard Knicks fan. I can still remember the lump in my throat when I was at a Mets game in 1985 and the Diamond Vision announced that the Knicks had won the draft lottery, ensuring that they'd get Patrick Ewing and build a franchise around him. And yeah, they never won a title with him (damn that Michael Jordan!), but you always got the sense that they could.
Suffice to say, things have changed. They have a massive budget, a high profile, the biggest media market ... and yet they built a team around guys with neither the talent nor will to make the playoffs, much less win.
Lieberman-Warner is essentially taking a New York Knicks approach to GHG policy. It's got a huge budget. It's got a huge profile. It appears to be too big to fail. And yet its success is, to a large degree, dependent upon the actions of individuals who have neither the ability nor motivation to lower GHG emissions. Right game, wrong team. This is perhaps the deepest flaw with the Lieberman-Warner approach as currently structured, but also the most subtle. Here's why: