Articles by Sean Casten

Lieberman Warner criticism, Part 4

This is the fourth in a five-part series exploring the details of the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act. See also part 1, part 2, and part 3.

I grew up in New York and was a die-hard Knicks fan. I can still remember the lump in my throat when I was at a Mets game in 1985 and the Diamond Vision announced that the Knicks had won the draft lottery, ensuring that they'd get Patrick Ewing and build a franchise around him. And yeah, they never won a title with him (damn that Michael Jordan!), but you always got the sense that they could.

Suffice to say, things have changed. They have a massive budget, a high profile, the biggest media market ... and yet they built a team around guys with neither the talent nor will to make the playoffs, much less win.

Lieberman-Warner is essentially taking a New York Knicks approach to GHG policy. It's got a huge budget. It's got a huge profile. It appears to be too big to fail. And yet its success is, to a large degree, dependent upon the actions of individuals who have neither the ability nor motivation to lower GHG emissions. Right game, wrong team. This is perhaps the deepest flaw with the Lieberman-Warner approach as currently structured, but also the most subtle. Here's why:

Economic naïvete on carbon prices

If you put a price on GHG emissions, will it raise the cost of energy?

That question goes to the core of carbon policy. Unfortunately, many people inside and outside the environmental community consistently get it wrong, with potentially disastrous results.

Consider: if the answer is yes, then we don't need any incentives for GHG reduction. The costs of carbon-intensive energy will rise, giving we energy users the incentive they need to lower consumption.

But if the answer is no, we will find ourselves with a tax on dirty energy but no incentive to reduce its use. That is, we will end up with a greenhouse-gas policy that fails to do the one thing it's supposed to do above all else: lower our greenhouse-gas emissions.

The answer, more often than not, is no.

Lieberman Warner criticism, Part 3

This is the third in a five-part series exploring the details of the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act. See also part 1 and part 2.

Let's do a thought experiment. Imagine that tomorrow morning, you wake up, reach in your pocket, and find that you suddenly have billions of dollars of cash. Before you have a moment to celebrate, you also realize that you are lying in the middle of an interstate, and there is a big truck coming. What do you do?

(a) Issue an RFP for research, development, and deployment of technologies that will help you get off the highway;

(b) Issue an RFP for research, development, and deployment of crash-retardant pajamas;

(c) Invest in wildlife conservation measures to protect the flora and fauna on the side of the highway that are about to be covered in blood, guts, and twisted metal;

(d) Set aside money for truck driver grief counseling, or;

(e) All of the above.

If you chose (e), read no farther. You have identified yourself as a person who thinks that the Lieberman-Warner approach to greenhouse-gas reduction is perfection incarnate. If, on the other hand, you think that there was a fairly important idea not even listed amongst the options above (hint: it has to do with getting your butt off the highway and/or stopping the truck), then you understand the flaws innate to the Lieberman-Warner approach.

(And if you chose a, b, c, or d ... you're one odd duck. But at least you've signaled your self-interest in high-tech solutions to simple problems!)

Lieberman-Warner criticism, Part 2

This is the second in a five-part series exploring the details of the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act. See part 1 here.

With atmospheric GHG concentrations rising at a frightening rate, we need a full court press to change directions, using every possible tool at our disposal. From an economic perspective, this means that we not only need to impose financial penalties on polluters, but also provide financial incentives for those who act to lower GHG emissions. We need a market mechanism in place so that the costs of GHG emission -- or the revenue associated with GHG reduction -- factors into individual investment decisions immediately. In short, we need big sticks and big carrots. The Climate Stabilization Act (CSA), as the Lieberman-Warner Bill is known, is a small stick with no carrot. This post explains why.