Articles by Sean Casten

A closer look at current U.S. CO2 pricing

Kevin Drum over at Mother Jones blogged on my recent Grist post, joining my mom in the list of people who publicly praise my math skills. Thanks!

Much more interestingly, he raises this question:

Are we wiling to charge [a price for CO2 emissions] openly, with the carbon charges going to the public, [or] inside a complex giveaway to a favored corporation?

(The question is in response to my estimate here that the recently passed Illinois Clean Coal Portfolio Standards Act represents an implicit $300-$500-per-ton payment in the name of CO2 reduction.)

It's a great question because the truth is that under current federal and state policy, we do pay people for their actions to reduce CO2. But we do so in a horribly inconsistent way, providing not only inconsistency between technologies and "favored corporations," but also wild disparities in price.

For instance, suppose you're getting $0.03 per kWh from your state renewable portfolio standard. Those kWh displace -- on average -- 1,300 lb per MWh of U.S. power, and you are therefore being paid $46 per ton of CO2 you reduce. CO2 reduction is not the only justification for RPS policies, but would we ever have an RPS if we didn't care about CO2? I doubt it.

The good news there is that people are, today, being paid in the U.S. for reducing CO2. But is there any rhyme or reason to their price? And is it at all consistent with what others are getting for the same environmental service?

More math below the fold.

Legislature approves 'Clean Coal Portfolio Standards,' green-lights new coal plant

OK, we've got Obama in the plus column for the state of Illinois. But in addition to the gubernatorial craziness going on in my home state, we've now got this: Tenaska, an independent power company, has been seeking to build a coal plant in Illinois. The problem being of course, that new, coal-fired power plants are really, really, really, really lousy investments. Tenaska tried to change government rules to ensure they made money.

That in and of itself isn't inherently bad. Every company has a vested interest in tweaking laws to benefit their shareholders. But to ask is nobler than to receive. I wouldn't be a bad person if I asked the state to give me $1 million a year to support my crack habit, but if the state gave me that money and I accepted, we would both be complicit.

So how did the Illinois legislature respond? "Clean Coal Portfolio Standards." Seriously.

Parsing Section 451 of the House stimulus package

Here are some thoughts on the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act recently unveiled by House leaders -- specifically, the appropriation of Section 451 (aka "Subtitle E") from the 2007 Energy Bill.

For obvious reasons, we've been following this bill very closely, which not only provides $10 per MWh to waste heat recovery and high-efficiency cogeneration projects, but it also provides a nice suite of carrots to induce the states to reform their paleolithic electricity regulatory laws. Often these laws have long been perhaps the biggest barrier to reducing the carbon footprint of U.S. electricity generation and distribution.

For less obvious reasons, it's hard to get programs like this through the Congress. This is the result of some peculiarities of the way the federal government makes decisions to spend money:

1. Tax bills require one vote to enact (OK, technically three, since they have to be approved by both houses and then signed by the President, but it is a single vote on a single decision throughout). All other fiscal bills require two votes: the first authorizes the funding, and the second appropriates the money through the budget process. Since no vote is certain, this makes it much easier for regulators to get things done by tinkering with tax policy than through any other measure. In no small part, this is why the tax code is so full of complexity, loopholes, and social-engineering run amok. But I digress.


2. Any appropriation process must be "scored." This is the process by which the Congressional Budget Office estimates the cost of the legislation to the Treasury for the purpose of figuring out whether we can afford it. That's quite reasonable, but the nature of the process is such that it tends to ignore most of the upside because it does not readily differentiate between good and bad investments. (It is as if you made a decision to buy a stock based on the price per share without any consideration of whether it was likely to rise or sink in the future.) This becomes especially problematic when the economy sours, as the stimulative effects of investments are not readily quantified or evaluated precisely at the time when they are most needed.

Frustrating as this may be, the good news is that the limitations are well-understood by those inside the Beltway. Setting aside what the scoring rules say, here is what Section 451 will actually do for the U.S. economy ... with lessons broadly applicable to investments in all flavors of enhanced resource efficiency.

Coal group wants climate bill to build more coal plants

News from the Super-Shoddy Climate Change Reporting desk: The Bemidji Pioneer broke this story on Tuesday:

Partners for Affordable Energy, which describes itself as "a broad-based coalition of organizations and businesses that support coal-based electricity as a low-cost, reliable, and increasingly clean energy source for consumers, farms and businesses in the Upper Midwest," is lamenting the fact that Minnesota's Next Generation Energy Act, particularly its standards for CO2 emissions, would put a stop to coal-fired power plant construction.

Setting any moral judgments aside, that's what you would expect them to say. It's not especially noteworthy, but check out how the group justifies their argument: