Articles by Gar Lipow

VRB Power accquired by Chinese Prudent Energy

Back in early January, I mentioned it was bad news that VRB, the makers of large-scale, long-lasting vanadium flow batteries for storing electricity, was going out of business. Well their […]

What stops us from acting more boldly on economic and environmental policy

[Note: Since comments are turned off, if you have thoughts, email me at glipow AT gmail.com. ]

A lot of energy is expended on Grist showing that good environmental policy is good economic policy -- to show that green pays. But it is just as important to show the same thing from the other direction. Economic policy will only pay if includes strong environmental features. Let's look at the current responses to our economic crisis from that perspective. We'll start by comparing what we are doing as compared to what we should be doing, and then move on to explaining the difference.

Let's start with the economic stimulus package that was just passed. It is not nearly big enough. It was structured on fighting a smaller unemployment rate than we already face, let alone the rate at which unemployment will peak. Those radical leftists in the World Bank are noticing that the recession is worldwide, which would indicate a deeper recession than Obama's stimulus was intended to fight. Though you would not know it from the corporate media, quite a number of respected economists predicted from the beginning that this was too small a stimulus. Even intelligent conservatives are starting to say we need a second, bigger stimulus.

Where to put the money from a second stimulus? Keeping public transit going, which otherwise loses subsidy revenue during downturns, gives a double return in not only saving jobs and demand that would otherwise collapse, but also reducing oil use, greenhouse gas emissions, and traffic congestion. In general, making up for losses in state and local revenues reduces pro-cyclical job losses that otherwise make a recession worse.

But we have good reason to consider long-term investment in infrastructure as well. Much necessary infrastructure spending is "shovel-ready." For example, suppose we decide to put $450 billion into upgrading our freight rail system to move 85 percent of long-haul trucking miles to rail? We can invest immediately into the planning this will entail. And we can stockpile parts and materials we know this upgrade will require. And we can implement already proposed unfunded short-term projects that will be needed components of such an upgrade: new switch yards, new freight yards, and various other log-jam breaking proposals.

Sheer number of solar advancements suggests that cheap solar electricity is coming soon

Concentrating solar power is a well-known approach to lowering the cost of solar electricity. You focus sunlight from a large area onto a small one, the same way a magnifying glass can set a piece of newspaper on fire, using one small, high-quality solar cell and a concentrator for a lower total cost than hundreds of slightly cheaper cells. (Or you can use the concentrated heat to drive a heat engine, but not in the example we are about to discuss.)

Morgan Solar has a smart variation on this under development. They start with a clever acrylic concentrator that uses pure optical guiding to concentrate solar energy about 50 times, around the same results as a Fresnel lens, but without the need for curves or a non-zero focus. This already moderately concentrated solar is then concentrated further by a much smaller glass concentrator that also needs no air gap. Because neither concentrator requires an air gap, a tiny solar cell is attached directly to the glass.

So you have an eight-inch acrylic concentrator, a glass concentrator the size of an American nickel, and a solar cell the size of a baby's thumbnail.

Low permit prices undermine infrastructure transformation

Back when I worked developing large software systems, every now and then we ran into a bug that management decided was too much trouble to fix -- "It's not a bug. It's a feature!" This is the approach that Kevin Drum seems to be taking when it comes to volatility in cap-and-trade programs.

The short version of the volatility problem is that with a trading system, permit prices vary not only in response to how many permits are issued, but also in response to general economic conditions. As a result permit prices bounce up and down a lot. Kevin, like a number of cap-and-trade supporters argues that this volatility is a good thing, because permit prices drop during bad times when people don't have money to invest, and they rise during times when they do. In short they argue that counter-cyclicality makes volatility positive rather than negative. But, just as in the software industry, I'm afraid it is still a bug, not a feature.

To the extent that emissions pricing accomplishes anything it drives investment in emission reducing infrastructure. But when emission prices drop too low, firms project long-term prices to be low as well. Managers get a lot more points for increasing or preserving market share than they do for managing environmental risks. Top bosses don't want to hear that emissions costs are going to rise, and the company needs to invest in reductions to comply with a cap-and-trade system. They want to hear that they can concentrate on their core business and buy low-cost permits from all the other firms reducing emissions. There is always a sound business case to be made for the other guy to reduce his pollution.